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Confusion in the Time of COVID: The 
Supreme Court’s Lack of Clarification in 
Balancing a Public Health Emergency and 
the Constitutional Right to Free Exercise 
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020). 
Lauren M. Marsh* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The case of Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak demonstrates the 
breadth of a State’s authority during a public health crisis.1  The SAR-Co-V-
2 (“COVID-19”) pandemic led to the declaration of emergency orders and 
most states creating guidelines for the public to follow to reduce the potential 
spread of the virus.2  These guidelines typically included bans on large 
gatherings, including gatherings in houses of worship, after research showed 
that large gatherings often turn into “superspreader” events.3  This led to 
 
* B.S. John Brown University, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021; 
Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2021-2022. 
1. 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020). 
2. Memorandum from National Governors Association to Interested Parties 
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.nga.org/state-covid-19-emergency-orders/ 
[https://perma.cc/7SPG-5SCX] (discussing an overview of state actions on business 
closure and personal movement restrictions in response to COVID-19); Rachel 
Treisman, West: Coronavirus-Related Restrictions by State, NPR (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/01/847416108/west-coronavirus-related-restrictions-
by-state [https://perma.cc/8DBR-R4TJ]. 
3. A superspreader event is where “the number of cases transmitted will be 
disproportionately high compared to general transmission.” Holly Honderich, 
Coronavirus: What makes a gathering a “superspreader” event? BBC NEWS (July 4, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53273382 
[https://perma.cc/N9VH-TXY8]; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Religious Liberty in 
a Pandemic, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2020); Dillon C. Adams & Benjamin J. 
Cowling, Opinion, Just Stop the Superspreading, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), 
1
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numerous lawsuits claiming impediments in violation of the First Amendment 
Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution.4  The United States 
Supreme Court’s lack of clarification of how to balance constitutional analysis 
with a public health emergency is a cause for confusion and concern in how 
States should proceed during a public health emergency.   
Part II of this Note outlines the facts and procedural background of 
Plaintiff Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley’s (“Calvary” or “Calvary Chapel”) 
requests for emergency injunctive relief from COVID-19 pandemic 
restrictions.  Part III provides the legal background relevant to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, focusing on the development of tests for religious 
discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause and state authority during a 
public health crisis.  Part IV details the Supreme Court’s ruling in Calvary’s 
case, which denied Calvary’s application for emergency injunction to be able 
to hold church services with more than fifty congregants.  Part V discusses 
the consequences of the expanded state authority during a public health crisis 
in terms of personal liberty.   
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On May 28, 2020, Defendants, including Governor of Nevada Steve 
Sisolak, Attorney General of Nevada Aaron Ford, and Sheriff of Lyon County 
Frank Hunewill, issued and enforced “Emergency Directive 021 – Phase Two 
Reopening Plan” (“Emergency Directive” or “Directive”) in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.5  The Emergency Directive detailed how specific 
categories of businesses or social activities should proceed in the midst of the 
pandemic.6  Notably, the Emergency Directive stated, “Effective 12:01am on 
May 29, 2020, consistent with other Directives on public gatherings, houses 
of worship may conduct indoor in-person services in a manner so that no more 
than fifty persons are gathered, and all social distancing requirements are 
satisfied.”7  Most other businesses and social activities were limited to fifty 
 
https://nyti.ms/2MnY6be [https://perma.cc/5M2Z-4YWS]; Christie Aschwanden, 
How ‘Superspreading’ Events Drive Most COVID-19 Spread, SCI. AM. (June 23, 
2020),  https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-superspreading-events-
drive-most-covid-19-spread1 [https://perma.cc/THM9-DDE6]; Cassell v. Snyders, 
458 F. Supp. 3d 981, 997 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (listing “examples where religious services 
have accelerated” COVID-19’s spread).   
4. Linda A. Sharp, COVID-19 Related Litigation: Constitutionality of Stay-at-
Home, Shelter-in-Place, and Lockdown Orders, 55 A.L.R. FED. 3d Art. 3 (2020). 
5. GOVERNOR SISOLAK, COVID-19 DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY DIRECTIVE 




6. Id.  
7. Id. at § 11.  
2
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percent of their fire code capacity, 8  but a few were limited to the lesser of 
fifty percent the fire code capacity or fifty people.9 
Shortly thereafter, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley filed suit against the 
state of Nevada.10 Calvary Chapel is a protestant church located in Dayton, 
Nevada.11 Calvary sought injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds to 
allow indoor, in-person church services with more than fifty people amid the 
COVID-19 pandemic, despite Nevada’s Directive.12  
A.  The District Court 
Calvary initially filed emergency motions for a temporary restraining 
order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction on May 28, 2020 in the United 
States District Court of Nevada.13  Calvary’s motions focused on a First 
Amendment Free Exercise challenge and a selective enforcement challenge 
to the Directive,14 arguing for the application of strict scrutiny because the 
Emergency Directive was neither generally applicable nor neutral.15  Calvary 
also brought a Free Speech claim, but this argument was not given much 
weight in the motion or in the court’s decision.16    Further, Calvary argued 
the Emergency Directive failed strict scrutiny because the ban was not 
narrowly tailored to stopping the spread of COVID-19.17  Finally, Calvary 
 
8. The listed businesses include non-retail indoor venues excluding indoor 
movie theaters (e.g., bowling alleys, arcades), non-retail outdoor venues (e.g., 
miniature golf facilities, amusement parks and theme parks), retail businesses, indoor 
malls, gyms, fitness facilities, public aquatic venues, and body art and piercing 
facilities. Id. at §§ 17–18, 20–21, 28–29, 31.  
9. The listed businesses include movie theaters, art galleries, zoos, aquariums, 
and trade or technical schools. Id. at §§ 20, 30, 32.  
10. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604 (2020) 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
11. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 3:20-cv-00303-RFB-VCF, 
2020 WL 4260438, at *1 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020), rev'd and remanded, 982 F.3d 1228 
(9th Cir. 2020). 
12. Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2604 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
13. Calvary Chapel, 2020 WL 4260438, at *1. 
14. Id.   
15. Strict scrutiny applies for Free Exercise cases when the restrictions are not 
“neutral and generally applicable.” Id. at *2 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)).  
16. Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction at 17, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 3:20-cv-
00303-RFB-VCF, 2020 WL 4260438 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020) [hereinafter “Plaintiff’s 
Emergency Motion”]. 
17. “’[B]roadly formulated’ statewide interests and generalized descriptions of 
health risks, like those referenced by the Governor here, are not compellng.” Id. (citing 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 
(2006). To survive strict scrutiny, a law that is not neutral or not generally applicable 
3
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argued that it was entitled to injunctive relief because Calvary would suffer 
irreparable harm without an injunction,18 the balance of equities favored 
injunction,19 and the injunction would serve the public interest.20 
Nevada responded to Calvary’s motion and argued for the application of 
rational basis scrutiny because both religious and secular activities were 
subject to the orders, therefore the Directive was generally applicable and 
neutral.21  Nevada claimed that the businesses and activities included in the 
fifty-person limit were “places where ‘people sit together in an enclosed space 
to share a communal experience,’” which includes both religious and secular 
gatherings.22  Nevada additionally provided alternatives that Calvary could 
implement to be “consistent with the White House’s Phase 2 guideline.”23  
Further, Nevada asserted that the Directives should survive rational basis 
scrutiny because the goal of the Directive was to save lives by slowing the 
pandemic’s infection rate, an interest that should qualify as compelling under 
even a heightened standard of review.24  Nevada provided an additional 
 
must be “justified by a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.”  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32.  
18. “The Supreme Court recognizes that ‘the deprivation of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparably 
injury.’”  Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion, supra note 17, at 21, (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 
19. “The equities favor the Church because the law places a premium on 
protecting constitutional rights. . . Meanwhile, an injunction need not harm 
Defendants at all. Local health officials can subject infected persons to orders of 
isolation and quarantine.  And the State remains free to adopt permissible and 
reasonable regulations for in-person worship services, including narrowly tailored 
social distancing and health and safety measures, in a similar fashion as it has done 
with secular activities.”  Id. 
20. “’[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 
constitutional rights.’  This is particularly true for First Amendment freedoms.  
Because the requested injunction will accomplish this, the public interest also favors 
an order protecting the Church.”  Id. (quoting de Jesus Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 
695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)) (internal citation omitted). 
21. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
12–13, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 3:20-cv-00303-RFB-VCF, 2020 
WL 4260438 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020) [hereinafter “Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Emergency Motion”]. 
22. Id. (quoting Gish v. Newsom, No. EDCV 20-755 JGB, 2020 WL 1979970 
(Apr. 23, 2020)).  Nevada lists schools, live concert halls, movie theaters, and sports 
venues with spectators as evidence that secular activities are included in the fifty-
person limit. Id. 
23. Id. (suggesting conducting drive-in services, online programs, and in-person 
assemblies of up to fifty people).  
24. Id. at 17. “Further, Calvary’s analysis as to why the emergency directives do 
not constitute the ‘least restrictive means’ of furthering any compelling interest 
highlights why Jacobson and South Bay provide state officials with added discretion 
when exercising emergency police powers.  It is not the place of Calvary, Calvary’s 
4
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analysis distinguishing this case from normal Free Exercise Clause cases 
because of State authority during a public health emergency, arguing that the 
Emergency Directive should be upheld under the additional deference granted 
to State authority during a public health crisis.25 
The District Court of Nevada denied Calvary’s motion on June 11, 2020, 
after conducting a review of the facial First Amendment Free Exercise 
challenge and the as-applied Free Exercise challenge,26 finding that Calvary 
was not entitled to the TRO or preliminary injunction because Calvary’s 
claims were not likely to succeed on the merits.27  Regarding the facial 
challenge, the court agreed with Nevada that Nevada had broad deference 
during this public health crisis.28  The district court also determined that places 
of worship were not treated less favorably than similarly secular activities.29  
Regarding the as-applied challenge, the district court found the selective 
enforcement claim to be premature given a lack of evidence.30  
 
counsel, or this court to exercise discretion on where or how to protect public health 
against a novel, highly contagious virus.”  Id. 
25. Id. at 8.  
26. A facial challenge “seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation itself” by 
claiming “the statute may rarely or never be constitutionally applied.”  16 C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 243 (2021).  An as-applied challenge seeks to invalidate the 
statute as to the operation of it in a particular case, “conced[ing] that a statute may be 
facially constitutional or constitutional in many of its applications but contends that it 
is not so under the particular circumstances of the case.”  Id.  
27. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 3:20-cv-00303-RFB-VCF, 
2020 WL 4260438, at *2 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020).  “A preliminary injunction is ‘an 
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff 
is entitled to such relief.’”  Id. at *1 (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)).  “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must 
establish four elements: ‘(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that the plaintiff 
will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the 
balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) that the public interest favors an 
injunction.’”  Id. (quoting Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 
F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014)).  
28. Id. at *2  (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)) 
(“When state officials ‘undertake[] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific 
uncertainties,’ their latitude ‘must be especially broad.’”).  
29. Id. at *3 (“[C]asinos are subject to substantial restrictions and limitations 
required by the Nevada Gaming Control Board which exist in addition to and in 
conjunction with the requirements and oversight provided by the Emergency 
Directive.”) (“[O]ther secular entities and activities similar in nature to church services 
have been subject to similar or more restrictive limitations on their operations. 
[C]hurch services consist of activities, such as sermons and corporate worship, that 
are comparable in terms of large numbers of people gathering for an extend [sic] 
period of time to lectures, museums, movie theaters, specified trade/technical schools, 
nightclubs and concerts. All of these latter activities are also subject to the fifty-person 
cap or remain banned altogether under the Emergency Directive.”).  
30. Id. at *4 (“The Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of such a pattern of 
selective enforcement. While images of crowded casinos attached to its submission 
5
Marsh: Confusion in the Time of COVID: The Supreme Court’s Lack of Clari
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
652  MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
The District Court of Nevada did grant Calvary leave to file a new 
motion requesting injunctive relief, provided Calvary produced more 
evidence regarding the as-applied Free Exercise challenge.31  Instead, Calvary 
appealed the June 11 Order and requested the District court to reconsider an 
injunction.32  On June 19, 2020, the Nevada District Court again denied 
Calvary’s motion for injunction on the same basis as the June 11 Order.33  
Additionally, the district court took “judicial notice” of recent developments 
that further hindered Calvary’s likelihood of success on the merits, such as 
modifications by the Nevada Gaming Control Board making casinos subject 
to more severe restrictions than places of worship and Nevada’s recent record-
breaking increase in COVID-19 infections34  
B.  The Ninth Circuit 
Calvary filed an emergency motion for injunctive relief pending appeal 
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on June 22, 
2020.35  Calvary again argued for strict scrutiny alleging that comparable 
secular activities were treated more leniently under the Emergency 
Directive.36  Calvary also repeated its argument that the Emergency Directive 
must fail strict scrutiny.37  Calvary briefly addressed Nevada’s argument and 
the district court’s finding that Nevada had greater deference during a public 
health emergency, but quickly dismissed this contention, relying on their 
argument that the distinctions between activities do not further a compelling 
state interest.38  
 
may raise a potential future issue of selective enforcement, the Court must have more 
evidence than this to find a likelihood of success on the merits of a selective 
enforcement claim.”). 
31. Id. 
32. Valley v. Sisolak, No. 3:20-cv-00303-RFB-VCF, 2020 WL 3404700, at *1 
(D. Nev. June 19, 2020). 
33. Id.  (“Plaintiff has not demonstrated a strong showing of a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its claims.”).  
34. Id. at *2. 
35. Emergency Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal, Calvary Chapel 
Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-16169, 2020 WL 4274901 (9th Cir., July 2, 2020).  
36. Id. at 10–14 (citing examples from casinos, restaurants, amusement parks, 
gyms and fitness facilities, and mass protests). 
37. Id. at 18 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)) (“Nevada has no compelling interest in allowing 50%-
occupancy gatherings at casinos, restaurants, theme parks, and gyms (and no 
numerical limits on protests)—but only 50 people at houses of worship. . .  Nor is the 
Governor’s directive narrowly tailored.  More favorable (50%-occupancy) rules apply 
to ‘analogous nonreligious conduct,’ and Nevada’s health interests ‘could be achieved 
by’ adopting an identical rule for churches that burdens religion ‘to a far lesser 
degree.’”).  
38. Id. at 18–19 (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)) 
(“Even applying Jacobson, which addressed a neutral across-the-board vaccination 
6
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Nevada responded, again arguing that Calvary was not likely to succeed 
on the merits under rational basis review.39  Nevada stressed the broad 
deference granted to state officials during public health emergencies and 
repeated that comparable activities were subject to the same restrictions as 
places of worship.40  Additionally, Nevada provided multiple, recent cases 
where courts rejected similar public health emergency Free Exercise 
challenges.41  The Ninth Circuit promptly denied this motion on July 2, 2020, 
simply citing Hilton v. Braunskill42 and South Bay United Pentecostal Church 
v. Newsom43 as support.44  
C.  The Supreme Court 
Calvary subsequently submitted an application for injunctive relief to the 
U.S. Supreme Court on July 8, 2020.45  Calvary’s application contained each 
argument that it presented at the lower courts,46 but placed more emphasis on 
 
requirement, the Governor’s discriminatory treatment of constitutionally-protected 
worship services ‘has no real or substantial relation to [public health], or is, beyond 
all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.’  
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.  Restrictions ‘inexplicably applied to one group and 
exempted from another do little to further [health] goals,’ although they ‘do much to 
burden religious freedom.’”).  Calvary also brought a free speech claim, but this 
argument is not given priority.  Id. at 17. 
39. State Defendant’s Opposition to Emergency Motion for an Injunction 
Pending Appeal at 25–26, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-16169, 
2020 WL 4274901 (9th Cir., July 2, 2020) [“Hereinafter “Opposition to Emergency 
Motionn for an Injunction Pending Appeal”]. 
40. “Instead of acknowledging these comparable secular activities and the 
governing consensus, Calvary speculates that other activities it deems comparable are 
treated better than houses of worship.  With the exception of casinos and mass protests, 
none were addressed with record evidence with the district court.  Instead, Calvary 
breezily offers its opinion as to restaurants, amusement and theme parks, and gyms 
and fitness facilities, substituting it for Nevada’s public health officials who are 
responsible for addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.”  Id. at 21–22 (internal citations 
omitted). 
41. Id. at 17–21 (citing South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 
S. Ct. 1613 (May 29, 2020)). 
42. 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (defining “the factors regulating the issuance of a 
stay”).   
43. 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (denying a church’s application for injunction to be 
able to hold in-person church services in defiance of the Governor’s COVID-19 
Executive Order). 
44. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-16169, 2020 WL 4274901 
(9th Cir., July 2, 2020). 
45. Emergency Application for an Injunction Pending Appellate Review, 
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 19A1070, 2020 WL 4251360 (U.S. 
July 24, 2020) [hereinafter “Emergency Application”]. 
46. Calvary’s arguments include that the Emergency Directive is subject to strict 
scrutiny (not neutral or generally applicable), that the Emergency Directive should fail 
7
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the Free Speech claim, claiming “[t]he directive violates the Free Speech 
Clause by favoring commercial over non-commercial speech and the 
communication of secular perspectives over religious views.”47  Calvary also 
failed to emphasize Nevada’s argument for broad deference granted to states 
during public health crises – by reserving only one page out of a twenty-eight 
page motion to address this argument – demonstrating Calvary’s belief that 
the constitutional analysis should be primary.48  
Nevada responded by first arguing that the State is due additional 
deference during a public health crisis and describing similar public health 
emergency Free Exercise challenges that the courts have rejected.49  Nevada 
then repeated its argument that the Directives should be judged under a 
rational basis review and that the Directives do not violate the First 
Amendment.50  
Calvary submitted a reply brief disputing Nevada’s claim that secular 
activities were not comparable to houses of worship and specifying how 
comparable secular activities and business were treated better than houses of 
worship.51  Calvary also used this reply brief to provide more analysis on the 
state authority during a public health emergency argument, recognizing that 
this analysis was primary to the lower courts decisions.52  Calvary 
distinguished the facts of this case from South Bay and Jacobson v. 
 
strict scrutiny (not narrowly tailored to lowering COVID-19 infection rate) and that 
the emergency public health crisis does not justify arbitrary distinctions that do not 
aid health goals.  Id. at 12–27. 
47. Id. at 18. 
By empowering businesses like casinos, movie theaters, fitness classes, bars, 
theme parks, and bowling alleys to express commercial messages to larger in-
person audiences than places of worship are allowed to communicate 
noncommercial, religious messages, the Governor’s directive simply turns the 
First Amendment on its head. . .  Nevada officials blatantly demonstrated a 
preference for secular viewpoints here: they allow many business; for-profit 
inducements to thrive and applaud, encourage, and even participate in 
unlawful mass protests, all while threatening places of worship who refuse to 
play by their lopsided rules. . .  Governor Sisolak cannot decide that 
proliferating commercial speech and secular protests is worth the cost and then 
deem communicating religious ideas less valuable or worthwhile.   
Id. at 19–20. 
48. Id. at 25–26. 
49. Respondents Steve Sisolak & Aaron D. Ford’s Response to Emergency 
Application for an Injunction at 10–14, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 
S. Ct. 2603 (2020) [hereinafter Sisolak & Ford’s Response to Emergency 
Application”]. 
50. Id. at 9–24. 
51. Reply Brief in Support of Emergency Application for an Injunction Pending 
Appellate Review at 5–14, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 
(2020). 
52. Id. at 17–19. 
8
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Massachusetts,53 emphasizing the Jacobson holding that a mandate would be 
unreasonable if there was “‘no real or substantial relation to [the] object’ of 
protecting public health or safety ‘or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable 
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.’”54 
The Supreme Court rejected Calvary’s arguments and denied the 
application for injunctive relief.  Without detailing the reasoning in an opinion 
along with the decision, the Court leaves the unanswered question of whether 
the Court found Nevada’s arguments persuasive or whether the Court 
determined the case on an entirely different basis.  When a religious 
organization’s in-person worship services are restricted during a public health 
emergency, the Court leaves uncertainty in how burdensome and targeted the 
restrictions can be.     
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part analyzes the development of jurisprudence surrounding the 
Free Exercise Clause and moves to an examination of the development of 
State authority during a public health crisis.  
A.  The Free Exercise Clause 
The First Amendment forbids the United States government from 
“establish[ing] religion” or “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”55  
Although the language of the First Amendment appears absolute, courts have 
often been tasked with distinguishing between restrictions that unduly impede 
on the free exercise of religion and restrictions that may be permitted for the 
“protection of society.”56  The Supreme Court has been developing this Free 
 
53. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).  Jacobson is a 1905 case that upheld a mandatory 
vaccination law as a legitimate use of a state’s police power to protect public health 
and safety.  Id. at 39. 
54. Reply Brief in Support of Emergency Application for an Injunction Pending 
Appellate Review at 18, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 
(2020) (quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31).  
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  (quoting the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause, respectively).  The Free Exercise Clause is enforceable against States 
under Fourteenth Amendment.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.   
56. 
The [First] Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and 
freedom to act.  The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second 
cannot be.  Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.  
The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the 
enforcement of that protection.  In every case the power to regulate must be so 
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the 
protected freedom.   
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–304 (1940); see also Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“Congress was deprived of all legislative 
9
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Exercise jurisprudence since Reynolds v. U.S., the first Supreme Court case to 
address the issue of Free Exercise.57  
In Reynolds, the Court upheld a federal law that banned polygamy, 
despite religious objections by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, who claimed polygamy as part of their religious practice.58  
The Court held that marriage is a “sacred obligation,” but it is also “a civil 
contract, and usually regulated by law.  Upon it society may be said to be built, 
and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, 
with which government is necessarily required to deal.”59  
The original test for Free Exercise challenges came from Sherbert v. 
Verner.60  In Sherbert, the plaintiff was unable to work on Saturdays due to 
her religious beliefs.61  The plaintiff filed for unemployment after she was 
unable to find employment that would not require her to work on Saturdays.62  
The Employment Security Commission found that the plaintiff was ineligible 
for unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment 
Compensation Act because she did not have good cause to refuse other 
employment, as required under the Act.63  The Supreme Court determined that 
if this action was to withstand the constitutional challenge,  
it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary 
represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of 
free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of 
appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest in 
the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to 
regulate.’64  
The Supreme Court found this action imposed a substantial burden on the 
plaintiff’s free exercise of her religion.65  Next, the Supreme Court found that 
South Carolina did not have a compelling state interest that justified the 
burden.66  Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment disqualifying 
 
power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of 
social duties or subversive of good order.”). 
57. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
58. Id. at 166–67.  
59. Id. at 165. 
60. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
61. Id. at 399.  
62. Id. at 399–400. 
63. Id. at 401 (quoting South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, S.C. 
Code § 68-404 (1962)). 
64. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
65. Id. at 404 (“The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts 
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”). 
66. Id. at 406–09 (“The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the 
filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to 
10
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plaintiff from obtaining unemployment benefits.67  Thus, the Sherbert test 
requires that “governmental actions that substantially burden a religious 
practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.”68  
The Court shifted the Free Exercise doctrine in Employment Division v. 
Smith.69  In this case, two counselors at a drug rehabilitation organization were 
fired for ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony of the Native American 
Church.70  The Supreme Court undertook the case to determine whether 
Oregon’s prohibition of the religious use of peyote was lawful under the Free 
Exercise Clause.71  The Court in Smith declined to apply the Sherbert test, 
determining that the Sherbert test should only be applied in the unemployment 
compensation field.72  The Court narrowed the constitutional doctrine, finding 
that state regulations that are neutral and generally applicable do not violate 
the First Amendment, even if they unintentionally burden religious 
practices.73  The Court concluded that the law was neutral and generally 
applicable, therefore, the counselors did not have a valid claim for a Free 
Exercise Clause exemption.74  
 
Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment compensation fund but also 
hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.”). 
67. Id. at 410. 
68. Emp. Div., Dept. of Human Res. Of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 
(1990) (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401–03). “A regulation neutral on its face may, in 
its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental 
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398).  
69. Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
70. Id. at 874. Peyote is a Schedule 1 drug, which is defined by the Drug 
Enfrocement Administration as having no accepted medical use and and a likely 
potential for abuse. Id. at 903.  Ingesting peyote is a sacramental ritual in the Native 
American Church. Id. at 883. 
71. Id. at 876. 
72. Id. at 883 (“Applying that test we have, on three occasions, invalidated state 
unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability of benefits upon 
an applicant’s willingness to work under conditions forbidden by his religion.  We 
have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except 
the denial of unemployment compensation.  Although we have sometimes purported 
to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test 
satisfied.”) (internal citations omitted).  
73. Id. at 879.  “Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid 
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion proscribes (or prescribes).’”  Id. at 879 (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982)).  
74. Id. at 882. 
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In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,75 the Court 
succinctly summarized the current analysis for Free Exercise challenges.76  
In addressing the constitutional protection for exercise of religion, our 
cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of 
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of 
burdening a particular religious practice. …  A law failing to satisfy 
these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.77 
The Court further considered what it means for a law to be neutral and 
generally applicable.78  To determine neutrality, the Court focused on the 
purpose of the law, stating that a law is not neutral if the law’s objective “is 
to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.”79  
To determine whether the law’s purpose is to restrict religious practices, 
courts first analyze the text of the law, “for the minimum requirement of 
neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.”80  The general 
applicability analysis rests on whether religious activities are burdened to the 
same extent as nonreligious activities.81  
If the law allegedly burdening religious practice is not neutral or 
generally applicable, it must withstand strict scrutiny.82  In other words, the 
 
75. 508 U.S. 520, (1993) (internal citation omitted).  This case involved a city 
ordinance passed to effectively prohibit a Santeria church’s practice of ritual animal 
slaughter by prohibiting all animal slaughter except by “‘licensed establishments’ of 
animals ‘specifically raised for food purposes.’”  Id. at 527–28.    
76. Id. at 531–32. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 533, 543. 
79. Id. at 533. 
80. Id.  “A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a 
secular meaning discernable from the language or context.” Id. 
81. Id. at 542–43(“[I]nequality results when a legislature decides that the 
governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against 
conduct with a religious motivation.  The principle that government, in pursuit of 
legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct 
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by 
the Free Exercise Clause”).  
82. See id. at 531 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not 
of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”). Strict scrutiny 
applies to laws that discriminate on the base of a “suspect” classification—e.g., race, 
alienage—and laws that burden the exercise of fundamental rights, e.g., Free Speech, 
Free Association, Free Exercise.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268–69 (June 2007).  There are other levels of scrutiny 
including intermediate scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny.  Intermediate scrutiny 
applies when laws involve classifications of quasi-suspect classifications—e.g., 
gender, illegitimacy—and incidental burdens on free speech. Gayle Lyne Pettinga, 
12
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law must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling state interest.83  
While the Court did not define everything that could be a compelling interest, 
it did find that “[w]here the government restricts only conduct protected by 
the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other 
conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the 
interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling.”84  
Additionally, a restriction is not narrowly tailored if the compelling interests 
“could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far 
lesser degree.”85  Thus, if there is a less burdensome way of accomplishing 
the compelling interest, strict scrutiny requires that the restriction utilize the 
less burdensome means.86  
B.  State Authority During a Public Health Emergency 
Since the early nineteenth century, the Tenth Amendment has been 
recognized as the basis for states’ police powers during public health 
 
Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L. J. 799, 
784 (1987). The withstand intermediate scrutiny, the law must further an important 
(rather than compelling) government interest and must do so by means substantially 
related (rather than narrowly tailored) to that interest.  Id. Rational basis scrutiny 
applies when neither fundamental rights nor suspect classifications are at issue.  
Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VIRGINIA L. REV. 
1627, 1629 (2016). To withstand rational basis scrutiny, the law must have a legitimate 
state interest (rather than important or compelling) and the law must be rationally 
related (rather than substantially related or narrowly tailored) to the state’s interest.  
Id.  
83. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32 (“To satisfy the commands of the First 
Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance ‘interests of the 
highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interest.”) (quoting 
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978); Emp. Div., Dept. of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e have 
respected both the First Amendment’s express textual mandate and the governmental 
interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial 
burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”).   
84. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47. 
85. Id. at 546. 
86. See id.; see also Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 847 (2011) 
(Thomas J., dissenting) (defining a law that passes strict scrutiny as “narrowly tailored 
to further a compelling interest, without there being a less restrictive alternative that 
would be at least as effective.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
13
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emergencies.87  Each state has a statute that outlines the actions that the state 
may take during a public health emergency.88  
In 1905, the Supreme Court through Jacobson v. Massachusetts upheld 
mandatory vaccination during a smallpox epidemic despite constitutional 
challenges.89 The Court in Jacobson stated specifically, “a community has the 
right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety 
of its members.”90  Jacobson also imparts a two-part standard in determining 
whether the requirement should be overturned.  First, the rule should be 
overturned if it “has no real or substantial relation to [the] object” of public 
health.91 Second, the rule should be overturned if it is “beyond all question, a 
plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”92  The 
Court in Jacobson recognized that there may be different modes to combat a 
public health crisis.93  In this situation, “[i]t is no part of the function of a court 
or a jury to determine which one of two modes was likely to be the most 
effective for the protection of the public against disease.  That was for the 
legislative department to determine in the light of all the information it had or 
could obtain.”94  
The Ebola outbreak over a century later supplied a few public health 
emergency cases, mostly focusing on mandatory quarantines.95  In Mayhew v. 
Hickox, a nurse was placed under mandatory quarantine upon her return to the 
United States after she was potentially exposed to Ebola while in Sierra 
Leone.96  The court found that the quarantine was unreasonable because the 
 
87. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers “not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.  In 1824, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Tenth Amendment provided states with the power to quarantine 
their citizens.  Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. 1, 112–13 (1824).  
88. State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-
statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/G293-HNDG] (last updated Aug. 7, 2020). 
89. 197 U.S. 11, 37–38 (1905).  
90. Id. at  27; see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) 
(“The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community 
. . . to communicable disease.”).  
91. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 30. 
94. Id.  Additionally, “the legislature has the right to pass laws which, according 
to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious 
disease.”  Id. at 35. 
95. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Connecticut v. Lamont, 970 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 
2020); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016). 
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State failed to prove that quarantine was “necessary to protect other 
individuals from the dangers of infection.”97  
Most recently, state actions taken to curb the spread of the COVID-19 
pandemic have given rise to an abundance of public health emergency 
litigation.98  The Supreme Court alone heard nine cases which concerned state 
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic as of October, 2020.99  Claims range 
from due process claims resulting from restrictions on non-essential surgeries 
and procedures (including abortion) as part of a state’s COVID-19 response100 
to Free Exercise claims resulting from restrictions on large gatherings as part 
of a state’s COVID-19 response.101 
Two recent Supreme Court cases overlap Free Exercise claims and state 
authority during a public health emergency, one of which is the subject of this 
note.102  In South Bay, the Supreme Court denied an application for injunctive 
relief that would enable a church to bypass restrictions ordered by the 
Governor of California in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.103  The Court 
did not write an opinion along with the denial, but Chief Justice Roberts wrote 
a concurring opinion, finding the restrictions did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause because “similar or more severe restrictions appl[ied] to comparable 
 
97. The nurse was asymptomatic, and Ebola can only be transmitted when 
symptoms are present.  Instead of quarantine, the court allowed her to undergo direct 
active monitoring pursuant to Center for Disease Control Guidelines.  Id. 
98. Lawsuits about State Actions and Policies in Response to the Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Lawsuits_about_state_actions_and_policies_in_response_to_t
he_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020 [https://perma.cc/Y8RF-PWGP] 
(listing 997 cases as of Oct. 18, 2020). 
99. Stephen Wemiel, SCOTUS for law students: COVID-19 and Supreme Court 
emergencies, SCOTUSBLOG (May 19, 2020 2:45 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/scotus-for-law-students-covid-19-and-
supreme-court-emergencies/ [https://perma.cc/VU3K-TFQ3]. 
100. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) (applying a Jacobson analysis, 
upholding a ban on non-emergency abortions in a COVID-19 emergency order),) 
vacated sub nom. Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, No. 20-305, 2021 WL 231539 (U.S. 
Jan. 25, 2021); Adams &  Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(upholding an injunction against Tennessee’s temporary ban on elective and non-
urgent surgeries, balancing the constitutional rights of a woman’s control of her body 
and of the state’s power during a public health emergency) vacated sub nom. Att'y 
Gen. of TN v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., No. 20-482, 2021 WL 231544 (U.S. Jan. 25, 
2021); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020) (applying Jacobson, upholding 
a ban on non-emergency abortions in a COVID-19 emergency order).  
101. J. Matthew Szymanski, Tracking Faith-Based Legal Challenges to 
Pandemic Orders, CHURCH LAW & TAX, 
https://www.churchlawandtax.com/web/2020/may/tracking-pandemic-related-
religious-liberty-cases.html [https://perma.cc/8DVH-HSD8] (collecting cases). 
102. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020); South 
Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
103. South Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613. 
15
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secular gatherings…where large groups of people gather in close proximity 
for extended periods of time.”104  Chief Justice Roberts further found that only 
dissimilar activities “in which people neither congregate in large groups nor 
remain in close proximity for extended times” are treated more leniently.105  
This appears to be a Free Exercise analysis finding that the California order 
was neutral and generally applicable.106  Chief Justice Roberts then discussed 
state authority during a public health emergency, acknowledging that 
restrictions on social activities “is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject 
to reasonable disagreement,” while also recognizing that matters of public 
health are entrusted “to the politically accountable officials of the States.”107  
Chief Justice Roberts further discussed the broad deference entrusted to state 
officials, stating, “where those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not 
be subject to second guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary.’”108 Roberts 
emphasized that the fact that deference should be given “is especially true 
where, as here, a party seeks emergency relief in an interlocutory posture, 
while local officials are actively shaping their response to changing facts on 
the ground.”109 
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in South Bay did not clearly assert 
which test, the Smith Free Exercise test or the Jacobson deference during a 
public health emergency test, would control when faced with a Free Exercise 
challenge in the midst of a public health emergency.110  The concurrence 
indicates that the COVID-19 Order would satisfy the constitutional analysis 
because houses of worship were not treated differently than comparable non-
religious activities.111  Chief Justice Roberts also indicates that COVID-19 
Order would satisfy a Jacobson analysis because the Order did not exceed the 
 
104. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
105. Id. 
106. See id. Although Chief Justice Roberts does not explicitly mention the test 
from Smith (a law that is not generally appliable or neutral must be justified by a 
compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to that interest), the 
discussion of comparing secular and religious is most similar to the general 
applicability analysis which rests on whether religious activity is burdened equally to 
nonreligious activities.  Id. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520,  542–43 (1993) (“[I]nequality results when a legislature decides that the 
governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against 
conduct with a religious motivation.  The principle that government, in pursuit of 
legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct 
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by 
the Free Exercise Clause.”).  
107. South Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).   
108. Id. at 1613–14 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonia Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528, 545, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985)).  
109. Id. at 1614. 
110. Id. at 1613–14. 
111. Id. (“[The] restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment. . . . That notion that it is ‘indisputably clear’ that the 
Government’s limitations are unconstitutional seems quite improbable.”).  
16
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“broad limits” of deference.112   It may be inferred that this Jacobson 
determination was only made after concluding the Order was consistent with 
the Free Exercise Clause.  The question remains unanswered which test would 
control if the outcomes for the two analyses were at odds, which is to say: 
what if the state singled out houses of worship for different treatment from 
similarly-situated secular activities during a pandemic?113  There is little 
judicial precedent to guide how States should handle such Free Exercises 
challenges amidst an emergency.114 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the majority denied the application for injunctive 
relief without providing any rationale, and no Justice provided a concurring 
opinion.115  This was a five-to-four decision with the majority opinion 
presented by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Roberts, Sotomayor, 
and Breyer.116  There were three dissenting opinions. These opinons, 
collectively, were joined by four justices, but Justice Thomas did not write his 





113. Some circuit courts have addressed this issue regarding abortion, but the 
decisions are inconsistent.  Compare In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(applying a Jacobson analysis, upholding a ban on non-emergency abortions in a 
COVID-19 emergency order) and In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020) 
(applying Jacobson, upholding a ban on non-emergency abortions in a COVID-19 
emergency order) with Robinson v. Attorney Gen., 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(upholding an injunction of a health officer’s order requiring non-emergency 
procedures to be postponed) and Adams &  Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913 (6th 
Cir. 2020) (upholding an injunction against Tennessee’s temporary ban on elective 
and non-urgent surgeries, balancing the constitutional rights of a woman’s control of 
her body and of the state’s power during a public health emergency). 
114. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, UPDATE: BANNING RELIGIOUS 
ASSEMBLIES TO STOP THE SPREAD OF COVID-19, 3 (Updated  June 1, 2020), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10450 [https://perma.cc/B3VK-
YMXU].  “[S]ome intermediate federal courts of appeal have held that in limited 
emergency circumstances, courts may apply a more lenient standard of review to 
analyze the constitutionality of measures responding to the emergency. . . Other 
federal appellate courts have applied an emergency-circumstances standard that asks 
whether the government acted in ‘good faith’ and ‘whether there is some factual basis’ 
to conclude that the acts ‘were necessary to maintain order.’”  Id. at 2–3.  
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A.  Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas and 
Kavanaugh.118 Justice Alito recognized that “imposing unprecedented 
restrictions on personal liberty, including the free exercise of religion . . . was 
understandable [as an initial response],” but the restrictions are not permitted 
to last for the entire length of the pandemic.119  Instead, Justice Alito suggested 
that “[a]s more medical and scientific evidence becomes available, and as 
States have time to craft policies in light of that evidence, courts should expect 
policies that more carefully account for constitutional rights.”120  Indicating 
that the Emergency Directive was issued more than two months after 
Governor Sisolak declared a state of emergency, Justice Alito would not 
characterize the declaration as one of exigency.121  
Justice Alito examined the directive under the Free Exercise and Free 
Speech claims, arguing that Calvary would likely succeed on both claims.122  
First, Alito determined that the directive was not generally applicable or 
neutral because the “directive specifically treats worship services differently 
from other activities that involve extended, indoor gatherings of large groups 
of people.”123  Following this conclusion, Justice Alito asserted that the 
directive must withstand strict scrutiny.124  The directive does not hold up 
under strict scrutiny according to Justice Alito’s analysis.125  Justice Alito 
reiterated the fact that “Nevada does not even try to argue that the directive 
can withstand strict scrutiny.”126  Justice Alito concludes that the limit on 
religious gatherings does not serve the compelling interest because it does not 
attempt to serve that interest in other areas, such as casinos.127  Justice Alito 
additionally suggests that even if the limitation of fifty people at religious 
 
118. Id. at 2603–09(Alito, J., dissenting). 
119. Id. at 2604–05. 
120. Id. at 2605. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 2605–09.In terms of the free speech claim, Alito found that the 
Governor favored certain speech, namely Black Lives Matter protests, over religious 
speech, in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 2607–08. 
123. Id. at 2605–06 (comparing the fifty person limit for churches to the 50% 
capacity limit for bowling alleys, breweries, fitness facilities, and casinos) 
(“[F]acilities other than houses of worship, such as museums, art galleries, zoos, 
aquariums, trade schools, and technical schools, are also treated less favorably than 
casinos, but obviously that does not justify preferential treatment for casinos.”). 
124. Id. at 2607. 
125. Id. at 2608. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 547 (1992) (“[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the 
highest order . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
prohibited.”)).  
18
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services serves a compelling interest, it would not survive strict scrutiny 
because there were less restrictive options.128 
After arguing that the directive must be examined under strict scrutiny 
and that the directive would fail that examination, Justice Alito turned to the 
issue of deference to state authority during a public health emergency.129  
Justice Alito, unconvinced that the Nevada directive would satisfy the 
Jacobson test,130 stated that the Jacobson analysis should not be determinative 
in situations “when statewide measures of indefinite duration are challenged 
under the First Amendment or other provisions not at issue in that case.”131  
Justice Alito rejected Nevada’s contention that the Emergency Directive 
deserves greater deference following the decision in South Bay.132  After 
recounting that Justice Alito had dissented in that opinion also, Justice Alito 
distinguished this case from South Bay because in South Bay, the activities 
and businesses that were treated more favorably than churches were dissimilar 
in that “people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close 
proximity for extended periods.”133  In this case, Justice Alito found that the 
businesses and activities favored in the Nevada Emergency Directive were not 
dissimilar to churches in that way.134  
B.  Justice Kavanaugh’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Kavanaugh joined Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion arguing that 
the Emergency Directive is overtly discriminatory toward religion but wrote 
a separate dissenting opinion to add further comments.135  Justice Kavanaugh 
sought to clarify that he outlined a test for religious discrimination cases where 
the law “divv[ies] up organizations into a favored or exempt category and a 
 
128. Id. (“And even if the 50-person limit served a compelling interest, that State 
has not shown that public safety could not be protected at least as well by measures 
such as those Calvary Chapel proposes to implement.”). 
129. Id. at 2608–09. 
130. Id. at 2608 (“[W]hen a state exercises emergency policy powers to enact 
an emergency public health measure, courts will uphold it unless (1) there is no real 
or substantial relation to public health, or (2) the measures are beyond all question, a 
plain[,] palpable [invasion] of rights secured by the fundamental law.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
131. Id. (indicating that Jacobson was a case concerned with substantive due 
process). 
132. Id. at 2608–09. 
133. Id. (quoting South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 
1613,  1614 (Roberts, C. J., concurring)).  
134. Id. at 2609(“In casinos and other facilities granted preferential treatment 
under the directive, people congregate in large groups and remain in close proximity 
for extended periods.”). 
135. Id. at 2609–15 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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disfavored or nonexempt category.”136  The test is used to determine whether 
the religious organizations fits the requirement Justice Kavanaugh defined: 
That “religious organizations be treated equally to the favored or exempt 
secular organizations, unless the State can sufficiently justify the 
differentiation.”137  Justice Kavanaugh describes this test as synonymous to 
the Smith test.138 
Justice Kavanaugh also responded to Nevada’s claim of expanded 
deference to the state during a public health emergency.139  Justice Kavanaugh 
agreed that courts should allow greater deference to states when it comes to 
opening certain businesses and activities during a pandemic, but since he had 
already determined that the law was discriminatory, Kavanaugh stressed that 
“COVID-19 is not a blank check for a State to discriminate against religious 
people, religious organizations, and religious services.  There are certain 
constitutional red lines that a State may not cross even in a crisis.”140  
Justice Kavanaugh, like Justice Alito, dissented in South Bay, “but 
accepting South Bay as a precedent,” distinguished this case because of the 
types of businesses and activities that are alleged to be dissimilar to religious 
services.141  Justice Kavanaugh determined that bars, casinos, and gyms 
“entail people congregating in large groups or remaining in close proximity 
for extended periods of time” and are therefore not dissimilar to religious 
services.142 
C.  Justice Gorsuch’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
136. Id. at 2611–12.  Three other categories of laws under review in Free 
Exercise or Establishment cases, as defined by Justice Kavanaugh, are as follows: “(1) 
laws that expressly discriminate against religious organizations; (2) laws that 
expressly favor religious organizations; (3) laws that do not classify on the basis of 
religion but apply to secular and religious organizations alike.”  Id. at 2610. 
137. Id. at 2613 (emphasis in original).  Justice Kavanaugh concedes that “the 
Court’s precedents do not require that religious organizations be treated more 
favorably than all secular organizations.”  Only that if there is an organization that is 
exempt or treated favorably, religious organizations must be too.  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
138. Id. at 2612. 
139. Id. at 2613–15. 
140. Id. at 2614.“This Court’s history is littered with unfortunate examples of 
overly broad judicial deference to the government when the government has invoked 
emergency powers and asserted crisis circumstances to override equal-treatment and 
free-speech principles.  The court of history has recognized those jurisprudential 
mistakes and cautions us against an unduly deferential judicial approach, especially 
when questions of racial discrimination, religious discrimination, or free speech are at 
stake.”  Id. at 2614–15. 
141. Id. at 2615.  In South Bay, the dissimilar businesses were restaurants, 
supermarkets, retail stores, pharmacies, hair salons, and offices.  Here, the allegedly 
dissimilar businesses and activities are bars, casinos, and gyms. Id. 
142. Id. 
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Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate dissenting opinion, comparing the 
restrictions for movie theaters and casinos to churches.143  Justice Gorsuch 
concluded that, “[i]n Nevada, it seems, it is better to be in entertainment than 
religion. . . . But there is no world in which the Constitution permits Nevada 
to favor Caesars Palace over Calvary Chapel.”144   
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly state how to balance a 
constitutional analysis of Free Exercise claims during a public health 
emergency.  In this case, the Court did not clarify how it arrived at its decision 
to deny an application for emergency injunction.  Three differing inferences, 
of consequence, could be made based on the analyses in the dissenting 
opinions – all of which focus on the likelihood of success on the merits.145   
A.  Prioritizing Free Exercise  
First, one could infer that the Court prioritized a Free Exercise analysis, 
but denied the injunction because Calvary failed to show that they were likely 
to succeed on the merits of this claim.146 It is plausible that the majority did 
not find that the Emergency Directive violated the Free Exercise Clause and 
would have prioritized the Free Exercise analysis had Calvary brought a 
meritorious claim.  This is the most likely reasoning under the inference that 
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in South Bay prioritized the constitutional 
analysis.  If this is the analysis the majority chose, the majority erred in 
denying the emergency injunction. Calvary Chapel should have been granted 
the emergency injunction because, unlike many of the other churches claiming 
a violation of the Free Exercise Clause due to COVID-19 restrictions,147 
Calvary Chapel’s claim would likely succeed on the merits of a Free Exercise 
analysis because the Emergency Directive would not survive strict scrutiny.  
As an initial matter, he Emergency Directive should invoke strict 
scrutiny because it is not generally applicable.  The analysis for general 
 
143. Id. at 2609. 
144. Id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
145. Other inferences could be that the Court prioritized a Jacobson analysis, 
but still found that the directive would survive strict scrutiny, that the Court did not 
find that Calvary would suffer irreparable harm, or that neither the balance of equities 
nor the public would favor an injunction.  These inferences are not likely based on the 
focus of lower courts’ findings and the arguments from the dissenting opinions.  Even 
if these inferences were accurate, it would still be beneficial for the Supreme Court to 
demonstrate its reasoning.  
146. This would be the most likely inference if Chief Justice Roberts’s 
concurrence in South Bay is read to conduct the Jacobson analysis only after finding 
the Order at issue to be consistent with the constitutional analysis.   
147. See e.g., COVID-19 Related Litigation: Constitutionality of Stay-at-Home, 
Shelter-in-Place, and Lockdown Orders, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 § 4 (2020).  
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applicability falls on whether the activities that are exempted – casinos, bars, 
and gyms – are similar to the activities that are not exempted – namely, houses 
of worship.148  Casinos and group fitness classes are similar to churches 
because these are three activities where “large groups of people gather in close 
proximity for extended periods of time.”149  Calvary Chapel can be 
distinguished from South Bay because South Bay restricted all businesses and 
activities comparable to churches in the same way that churches were 
restricted.150  In Calvary Chapel, other comparable businesses and activities 
were restricted just as much as churches, but some comparable businesses and 
activities were not.151  
The Emergency Directive should fail strict scrutiny because the State’s 
interest is not compelling, and the Emergency Directive is not narrowly 
tailored to a compelling interest.  While a general desire to promote health and 
safety amid a pandemic is a clearly compelling interest,152 Justice Alito’s 
analysis accurately follows the precedent in Lukumi in that the general 
compelling interest does not necessarily create a compelling interest for the 
action taken.153  This is particularly so when the action is not applied in a 
consistent manner to all potential targets. Nevada “fail[ed] to enact feasible 
measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm 
of the same sort,” such as the spread of COVID-19 at businesses and activities 
similar to churches—such as casinos.154  
 
148. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520,  542–43 (1993) (“[I]nequality results when a legislature decides that the 
governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against 
conduct with a religious motivation.  The principle that government, in pursuit of 
legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct 
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by 
the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
149. South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
150. Id.  
151. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2605 (2020) 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
152. See id. at 2613 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Nevada undoubtedly has a 
compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health 
of its citizens.”); South Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(“California undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of 
COVID-19 and protecting the health of its citizens.”); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 
415 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[N]o one contests that the Governor has a compelling interest in 
prevent the spread of a novel, highly contagious, sometimes fatal virus.”). 
153. Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2608 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Having allowed 
thousands to gather in casinos, the State cannot claim to have a compelling interest in 
limiting religious gatherings to 50 people—regardless of the size of the facility and 
the measures adopted to prevent the spread of the virus.”). 
154. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
546–47 (1993); see also GOVERNOR SISOLAK, supra note 6, at § 35.  
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Assuming an analysis where the interest is compelling in the context of 
the Emergency Directive’s specific restrictions,155 the Emergency Directive 
would still fail strict scrutiny because the limit of fifty people in a place of 
worship is not narrowly tailored to the goal of limiting the spread of COVID-
19.  As in Lukumi, Nevada had other means of serving the general compelling 
interest of curbing the spread of COVID-19 without a strict fifty person limit 
on houses of worship.156  For example, Nevada could have utilized the same 
limits for houses of worship and casinos, whether that be a strict fifty-person 
limit or a limit of fifty percent of the building’s capacity.  
A consequence of prioritizing the Free Exercise analysis is that during 
times of emergency, states typically would not have adequate time to fully 
develop their emergency policies.  Like Justice Roberts expressed, “local 
officials are actively shaping their response to changing facts on the 
ground.”157  Instead of effectively facing the emergency, states would be 
“bogged down in litigation.”158  
B.  Prioritizing Jacobson 
Second, the Court may have prioritized a Jacobson analysis and denied 
injunction despite finding Calvary likely to succeed on the merits of a Free 
Exercise claim because the Jacobson analysis essentially lowered the scrutiny 
of government officials’ actions during a public health crisis.  The inference 
that the Court prioritized a Jacobson analysis and denied injunction despite 
finding Calvary likely to succeed on the merits of a Free Exercise claim is 
plausible.  The dissenting opinions in Calvary Chapel each suggest that the 
dissenters would prioritize the Free Exercise analysis, lending support to the 
inference that the majority did not.159  Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent 
specifically supports this inference in his discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
history of “unfortunate examples of overly broad judicial deference to the 
government when the government has invoked emergency powers and 
asserted crisis circumstances to override equal-treatment and free-speech 
principles.”160  
If Jacobson controls, it would effectively lower constitutional scrutiny.  
There are numerous situations, like Justice Kavanaugh alluded, where broad 
deference to the government in the name of an emergency has been destructive 
to a vulnerable demographic’s constitutional rights.161   Reducing 
 
155. Cf., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47 (finding the city failed to demonstrate that 
the government interests were compelling “in the context of these ordinances”).  
156. See id. at 546. 
157. South Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1614.  
158. Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
159. See id. at 2603–15 (majority opinion) 
160. Id. at 2615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
161. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding an 
Executive Order requiring Japanese-Americans to relocate to internment camps under 
the guise of national security following the attack on Pearl Harbor); Hirabayashi v. 
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constitutional scrutiny would create a temptation for a state to use an 
emergency as an excuse to hinder rights belonging to “the most vulnerable 
members of society.”162  Currently, states unsympathetic to women’s rights 
have attempted to use the COVID-19 pandemic as justification to cripple a 
woman’s bodily autonomy with varying levels of success.163  Additionally 
with the current public health emergency, it is not clear how long the situation 
could last.  Justice Alito recognized that greater deference may be necessary 
at the onset of the emergency, but the emergency does not allow governors 
“to disregard the Constitution for as long as the medical problem persists.”164  
If the state officials retained heightened deference for the entire length of the 
emergency, this grant of power could also lead to an unwillingness to 
acknowledge when the emergency is over.  
C.  Equal Weight to Free Exercise and Jacobson 
Third, the Court may have provided equal weight to the Free Exercise 
analysis and the Jacobson analysis, but still denied injunction because Calvary 
failed to show that they were likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.  As 
described above, if this is the analysis the majority chose, the majority erred 
in denying the emergency injunction because I would find that Calvary would 
be likely to succeed on the merits of the claim.  
In balancing the consequences of prioritizing the two competing 
analyses, the potential for states to take advantage of an emergency situation 
to discriminate against vulnerable populations outweighs the potential 
inconvenience a state may face when establishing emergency policies.  While 
 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding a curfew for Japanese-Americans under 
the guise of national security following the attack on Pearl Harbor) (“[I]n time of war 
residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source 
of danger than those of different ancestry.”). 
162. Caroline Mala Corbin, Religious Liberty in a Pandemic, 70 DUKE L.J. 
ONLINE 1, 7 (2020).  
163. Id.; See, e.g., In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) (applying a 
Jacobson analysis, upholding a ban on non-emergency abortions in a COVID-19 
emergency order); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020) (applying Jacobson, 
upholding a ban on non-emergency abortions in a COVID-19 emergency order); 
Robinson v. Attorney Gen., 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020) (denying a motion to stay 
an injunction of a health officer’s order requiring non-emergency procedures to be 
postponed); Adams &  Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding 
an injunction against Tennessee’s temporary ban on elective and non-urgent surgeries, 
balancing the constitutional rights of a woman’s control of her body and of the state’s 
power during a public health emergency). See also Laurie Sobel, State Action to Limit 
Abortion Access During the COVID-19 Pandemic, KFF (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/state-action-to-limit-abortion-
access-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/ZC3S-TMCN]; Corbin, 
supra, at  7 n.36 (“That these bans were a pretext to eliminate abortion rather than 
preserve medical resources or prevent the spread coronavirus became evident by the 
bans’ inclusion of medical abortion which can be provided remotely.”). 
164. Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2605 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/16
2021] PUBLIC HEALTH AND FREE EXERCISE 671 
states should still be given deference under a Jacobson analysis in times of 
public health emergency, that deference should not allow the state to 
discriminate without withstanding strict scrutiny.  To give states deference 
despite infringing on constitutional rights would be to unnecessarily expand a 
state’s discretion.  Justice Kavanaugh is correct that the Free Exercise analysis 
should control because emergency powers should not be used as an excuse for 
veiled discrimination.165  Greater deference should not be blindly given to 
states, even in crisis, when strict scrutiny would be invoked.166  When a 
challenged law is subject to intermediate or rational basis scrutiny, a greater 
amount of deference may be given to the State because the stakes would not 
be as high.167  
D.  The Aftermath 
No matter which constitutional analysis the Court used, the new Court – 
consisting of the Trump appointee Justice Barrett in the late Justice 
Ginsburg’s seat – denied Calvary Chapel’s writ of certioriari which 
encouraged the Court to review the case in full, after its denial of the 
emergency injunction.168  While awaiting the Court’s decision on the writ of 
certioriari, the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of Calvary Chapel’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction, wholly because of the precedent provided by the 
decision in Roman Catholic Diocese.169  Roman Catholic Diocese was 
similarly at the Supreme Court on application for injunctive relief.170  In this 
case, the Court provided a per curiam opinion, two separate concurrences, and 
three separate dissents.171  
Perhaps if the majority in Calvary Chapel had written an opinion or 
provided a concurring opinion, the new Court may not have had the ability to 
shift Free Exercise jurisprudence without explicitly overturning past 
 
165. Id. at 2614.  
166. Strict scrutiny is invoked for laws that discriminate on the base of a 
“suspect” classification—e.g., race, alienage—and laws that burden the exercise of 
fundamental rights, e.g., Free Speech, Free Association, Free Exercise.  Fallon,  supra 
note 83, at 1268–69. 
167. Intermediate scrutiny applies when laws involve classifications of quasi-
suspect classifications—e.g., gender, illegitimacy—and incidental burdens on free 
speech.  Pettinga, supra note 83, at 784.  Rational basis scrutiny applies when neither 
fundamental rights nor suspect classifications are at issue.  Nachbar, supra note 83, at 
1629.  
168. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-639, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 
709 (Jan. 25, 2021).  
169. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 982 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 
2020) (citing Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) 
(per curiam)) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roman Catholic Diocese . . .  
compels the result in this case.”).  
170. 141 S. Ct. at 63. 
171. Id. at 63–81. 
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precedent.172  Additionally, if the Supreme Court had written an opinion along 
with the denial of injunctive relief for Calvary, the Ninth Circuit may not have 
determined that Roman Catholic Diocese compelled reversal.  Instead, the 
Ninth Circuit may have been able to distinguish Calvary Chapel and Roman 
Catholic Diocese.173 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Public health emergencies are not new, and there are likely to be more 
in the future.  Without a clear decision from the Supreme Court on how to 
balance the competing constitutional analysis and public health emergency 
analysis, courts are likely to continue to vary, creating confusion and 
conflicting outcomes.174  Arguably, the majority in Calvary Chapel should 
have written an opinion or concurrence to demonstrate the analysis for these 
issues.  If the Court had walked through the constitutional analysis, showing 
that the Emergency Directive was neutral and generally applicable, it would 
have made clear that the constitutional analysis was the top priority, even 
during a pandemic.  On the other hand, if the Court had shown that the 
Emergency Directive was neither neutral nor generally applicable and would 
not satisfy strict scrutiny, but still rejected the injunction, this would provide 
the lower courts with a clear procedure to follow for the inevitable multitude 
of lawsuits filed against COVID-19 policies.  Instead, lower courts have 
 
172. The per curiam opinion in Roman Caholic Diocese does not explicitly 
overturn the decisions in South Bay or Calvary Chapel or even refer to these previous 
cases. See id. at 63–69. The concurring opinions imply that Roman Catholic Diocese’s 
facts are distinct from these previous cases.  See id. at 69–75; id. at 72–73 (Kavanaugh 
J., concurring) (citing Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 
(2020)) (“To reiterate, New York’s restrictions on houses of worship are much more 
severe than the California and Nevada restrictions at issue in South Bay and Calvary.); 
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020)). 
173. Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese does 
distinguish the present case from Calvary Chapel. Id. (“To begin with, New York’s 
10-person and 25-person caps on attendance at religious services in red and orange 
zones (which are areas where COVID-19 is more prevalent) are much more severe 
than most other States’ restrictions, including the California and Nevada limits at issue 
in South Bay. . . . and Calvary Chapel.”). 
174. Compare Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(finding that Jacobson does not control a Free Exercise claim) and Adams &  Boyle, 
P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding an injunction against 
Tennessee’s temporary ban on elective and non-urgent surgeries, balancing the 
constitutional rights of a woman’s control of her body and of the state’s power during 
a public health emergency) with In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 786 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(“Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights may be reasonably restricted to 
combat a public health emergency.”) and In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 
2020) (applying Jacobson, upholding a ban on non-emergency abortions in a COVID-
19 emergency order). 
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interpreted different reasonings to the decision in Calvary Chapel which has 
created confusion in a time that is chaotic enough.175    
 
175. As of November 20, 2020, twenty cases already cited  Calvary Chapel as 
precedent. A Maryland District Court recently characterized the precedent as requiring 
a court to “apply Jacobson to determine whether the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims 
survive the motion to dismiss,” despite noting contrary authority such as Justice 
Alito’s dissent in Calvary Chapel.  Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Lawrence J. Hogan, 
No. CV CCB-20-1130, 2020 WL 6777590, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 18, 2020) (citing South 
Bay and four circuit court decisions); Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Lawrence J. 
Hogan, No. CV CCB-20-1130, 2020 WL 6777590, at *2 n.4 (D. Md. Nov. 18, 2020).  
Adversely, a Pennsylvania District Court rejected a balancing of Jacobson outright 
because of the concern that emergency measures could be indefinite, instead opting to 
apply “regular” constitutional scrutiny.  Cty. of Butler v. Wolf, No. 2:20-CV-677, 
2020 WL 5510690, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020).  The Pennsylvania court was 
persuaded by Professors Wiley and Vladeck of Harvard Law School who argue that 
courts have been erroneously applying a suspension model of judicial review during 
the COVID-19 pandemic in which “constitutional constraints on government [are] 
suspended in times of emergency.”  Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” 
Judicial Review, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. 179 (2020). 
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